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Gentex Corporation
Date: August 31, 2011 1:06:34 PM GMT-04:00
To: marciahoveywright@house.mi.gov, rick.snyder@michigan.gov
I saw this on the news last night and became so angry that I decided to let you know the real reason why we have so many unemployed in this state and so many companies looking for people to fill positions.
"And Gentex has jobs it can’t fill. More than 200 of them. And it plans to add another 1,150 in the next five years."
My younger brother ( 41 years old ) would love to fill one of the positions open at this company or any company. He is a skilled welder that the STATE OF MICHIGAN and MANPOWER has barred from getting any job.
“I think part of it is the mindset on manufacturing”, Los said. “People grow up and when you go home to mom and dad and say – hey – I’m going to go work in manufacturing, they’re kind of like oh – geez...you couldn’t find a real job somewhere?”
“When you’re at a cocktail party, do you want to say – my kid is going to Brown, or my kid is going to a technical school?” said Jeff Joerres, CEO of Manpower Group.
This was taken from the Habeas Appeal that the Michigan Court of Appeals Denied;
c. Your Applicant was adjudged to have 2 prior admissible drunken driving charges in his life, despite the fact that one of them had been when he was a Minor in 1987, was not admissible before the Courts upon his second violation within 7 years in 1990, thus your Applicant was therefore not penalized under the 5 year suspension for second offense in 7 years as applicable in 1990. This was done without any disclosure of the statute which pierces the separation of Actions under Minor Laws from Standard Criminal Law, and ;
d. Your Applicant was not informed by Counsel (Joseph Whetstone (Bar Number P-22235), the Constitutional Law Center, 1221 McKay Tower, Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503) at the time of his Plea agreement that he possessed protections from retroactive laws as a matter of his Right to a Stable Government and Laws pursuant to Applicant’s Right to a Republican Form of Government (Article 4 section 4 Constitution of the United States of America (1787),
c. Your Applicant has only recently discovered his Right to a Stable Government ad Laws in keeping with Article 4 Section 4 of the Constitution of the United States of America (1787), as revealed by the Concurring opinion of Judge Brickley of the Supreme Court of Michigan in, Evert Romein v. General Motors Corporation, 462 N.W.2d 555, 436 Mich. 515 (1990) (infra), and has immediately sought to exercise his due diligence to assert his new found Right and obtain restoration of his antecedent, in perpetuum, and fundamental Liberties.
When Michigan passed Heidi's Law on DUI's, the courts violated the Constitutional Right to;
49. Under your Applicant’s Right to a Republic subject to temporal limitations of its Legislative Powers, that which was forgiven your Applicant in the past and agreed to be in the past; such as Applicant’s Minor Act of Drunk driving in 1987, and inadmissible in at the time of his First Adult Drunk Driving charge in 1990, and that First offense being forgiven 10 years later in the year 2000 due to the 10 year statute of limitations existing at that time and at least 6 years prior to the enactment of Heidi’s Law; Applicant existed for 7 years with a clean slate between himself and the PEOPLE of Michigan, by agreement of the PEOPLE of Michigan through their laws, and cannot be dragged back in by mere alteration of statutes of limitation for non-expunged or non-forgiven acts.
50. Your Applicant asserts that the application of Heidi’s Law in this case breeched that societal agreement and legal status of the Applicant. It violated his Constitutional, Ninth, and Tenth Amendment protected Right to a stable government and a system of stable laws which is provided for by his Right to a Republican form of government bound to Temporal Legislative Limitations.
51. The Michigan Supreme Court confirms this fundamental Right to, and aspect of, a Republican form of Government guaranteed in the United States Constitution Article 4 Section 4, and states that retroactive Legislation needs to be checked by this argument which patches the wide hole in ex post facto argument, in order to restore and maintain the Republic:
“Troubled though I am by the 1987 amendments at issue here, reaching back as they do to rewrite the past by altering the past consequences of past transactions, the lamentable failure of the United States Supreme Court to articulate any discernible limits on the constitutionality of retroactive … legislation …
* * *
“The threat that retroactive legislation poses to our system of republican government should, in my judgment, be taken very seriously. The alarm has been sounded by Professor Julian N. Eule, in his recent article Temporal limits on the legislative mandate: Entrenchment and retroactivity, 1987 Am B Found Res J 379. I write separately primarily to amplify Professor Eule's message.
“Regarding the current state of the law, Professor Eule neatly sums up the sad state of affairs as follows:
Efforts to locate limits on retroactivity in the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, although once viewed as promising, seem to have fallen on hard times. The resurrection of the contract clause has not been paralleled under the due process provisions. The occasional noises emanating from the Court, designed to remind us that the route is not foreclosed, have a hollow ring to them. In Usery v Turner Elkhorn Mining Co [428 U.S. 1; 96 S Ct 2882; 49 L Ed 2d 752 (1976)], for example, Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, concluded … with the statement: "It does not follow, however, that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively."
* * *
“The Framers were not blind to the citizenry's need for some security from the "fluctuating policy" of successive legislatures. It was to fulfill this need, said Madison, that the contract and ex post facto clauses were written into the Constitution. Conflicting lessons can be drawn from the inclusion of these restraints. They may alternatively be viewed as limited sanctuaries from the otherwise unfettered authority of legislatures to undo the policy judgments of their predecessors or as compelling evidence of the disfavored status of retrospective lawmaking. It is the choice between these competing visions -- rather than the debate over natural law -- that ultimately divided Justices Iredell and Chase in Calder v Bull [3 U.S. (3 Dall) 386; 1 L Ed 648 (1798)].
* * *
“For Justice Iredell this ended the constitutional inquiry since he believed that the legislature's power necessarily included all that was not expressly denied to it.
* * *
“Iredell was not blind to the possibilities for abuse, but he contended that such risks had been undertaken willingly by the people when they delegated authority to their agents.
* * *
“Justice Chase viewed the people's grant as more restrained. Rejecting Iredell's assumption that power not denied was conferred, Chase maintained instead that power not conferred was denied. A determination of what authority the people had entrusted to their agents (through the federal or state constitution) could not be made without an understanding of the principles of a republican form of government. Legislation inconsistent with those principles should be viewed as beyond the scope of the grant. The inapplicability of the ex post facto clause did not foreclose the possibility that the power exercised by the … legislature was one that the people … had not conferred.
* * *
Chase's thesis was not that government could not be given the authority to act retrospectively, but that the conferral of power to act at odds with republican principles should not be "presumed."
* * *
“The voters do not delegate authority to rewrite history. Their earlier agents exercised legitimate authority when they enacted legislation. While such efforts may be repealed, this is not the same as retrospective eradication. A decision that bills defeated by prior legislatures can now be enacted and treated as if they had been enacted earlier arguably runs afoul of this same principle. The then-authorized representatives made a choice, and this decision demands recognition as the choice of the polity for that point in time. Each set of elected officials ought to be viewed as endowed by their sovereign with the mandate to make policy choices only within a bracketed temporal zone. Just as the delegation of authority does not encompass incursions into the domain of legislatures yet to come, it does not contemplate contravening the sanctity of time past.
* * *
“While I contend that the prohibition against entrenchment and retroactivity are both products of the temporal boundaries the electorate affixes to its mandate, I do not pretend that these two borders are drawn to serve identical ends. I do believe they manifest a common interest in affording each generation of voters the opportunity to determine for itself, through its representatives, the rules that will govern its daily life. The two constraints, however, satisfy different -- and at times conflicting -- human needs. The postmandate restriction protects flexibility. It preserves the polity's right to change its mind. The premandate limitation, on the other hand, offers stability. It enables the polity to alter its direction, without unduly undermining the security we all find so necessary. This means that the choices of our representatives can be relied on for the temporal realm in which these agents legitimately exercised authority. No more is guaranteed, but no less is tolerable. [Eule, (supra) , pp 441-446. Emphasis in original.]
“The Legislature in this case did not merely change the future consequences of past acts, … rather, the Legislature turns back the clock to redefine rights and liabilities enjoyed and owing in the past, notwithstanding the fact that those rights and liabilities had already been determined by an earlier and different body of agents of an earlier majority, determinations which the Legislature in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 declined to change. The legislation in this case violates the temporal limits of the 1987 Legislature.
Evert Romein v. General Motors Corporation,
462 N.W.2d 555, 436 Mich. 515 (1990)
Brickley, J. (concurring)
So when I read articles such as this one on Fox and watch this Propaganda on TV, when I know that there are so many people willing to fill those jobs except they all use Manpower Group who will not even take an application from a convicted felon, no matter what the charge, and most companies have a "NO FELON" rule, is it any wonder they can't find "QUALIFIED WORKERS".
My brother didn't get his last DUI because he caused an accident. He did get his last DUI because the Rockford police were stationed across the street from the Catholic Church who was holding a Beer Tent fundraiser and the officer followed my brother Alex Sasak until he was almost home. Then made an excuse about a tail light being out to pull him over. I guess the officer had a quota to fill.
Not only did this cause Alex Sasak to loose his good paying job, but he has lost his home to foreclosure, his life and everything he has worked all his life for. Do you think he may be just a little bit angry? I know I am.
There was no harm done to anyone, no personal damage, no injury to anyone, yet Alex Sasak is suffering the loss of everything just because an officer needed to meet his quota of tickets for the month. Well, THANK YOU MICHIGAN HIGH ARCHY. You did your jobs well to take the middle class and make them pay for your high priced Union Public Employees. I guess if you can't balance the budget one way, you will always find another to do it.
Rose Lear
Muskegon, Michigan
1-231-755-6293
Rose Lear
John 15: 20
"If they have persecuted me, they will also persecute you"
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